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The recent debate on happiness in economics has revived interest in
Scitovsky’s 1976 book The Joyless Economy, which aims at explaining
the income-happiness paradox, i.e. "why [American] unprecedented and
fast-growing prosperity had left its beneﬁciaries unsatisﬁed." A dynamic
economic model will distil Scitovsky’s proposal, which has not yet been
integrated into conventional economics. It will show that people’s dis-
satisfaction may be due to their excess of demand for ‘comfort’, which
requires consumption goods, and to their lack in pursuing ‘creative activ-
ities’, which instead essentially require leisure and a skill, called ‘leisure
skill’, that people have failed to develop. Since comfort includes com-
paring consumption with that of others, Scitovsky also strengthened the
conventional solution of the paradox.
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1"There are stimulating ideas aplenty in this volume. The challenge for the
next generation of economists is to discover how to formalize these ideas and in-
tegrate them into the existing body of neoclassical thought. We can be conﬁdent
that careful research along these lines yield high returns indeed"
(R.H.Frank. Foreword to The Joyless Economy, second edition, 1992, p.v)
1 Introduction
In his 1976 book The Joyless Economy, Tibor Scitovsky set out an innovative
approach to interpreting the income-happiness paradox, as captured by the key
question of “why [American] unprecedented and fast-growing prosperity had
left its beneﬁciaries unsatisﬁed” (1992[1976], p.vi). Scitovsky was innovative,
because he proposed to introduce in economics new psychological concepts, such
as intrinsic motivations, comfort, creativity and leisure skill, thereby extending
the explanatory power of the analysis.
Two years previously, Richard Easterlin had made evident the paradox by
ﬁnding that the average of self-reported happiness in the US was almost un-
changed over decades, despite economic growth, whereas richer people reported
greater levels of happiness than poorer ones (Easterlin 1974).1 Scitovsky con-
tributed to understanding the paradox by providing an analysis which is both
innovative and able to strengthen the currently most widely accepted solution
of the paradox (Clark et al. 2008).
Since the publication of The Joyless Economy, with the rapid development
of economic research on happiness, Scitovsky has been cited many times, and
by authoritative contributors in the ﬁeld (Easterlin, 1995; Clark and Oswald,
1996; Frank, 1997; Layard, 2005; Kahneman et al., 2006; Frey, 2008). He has
also been cited outside the economic ﬁeld, especially by psychologists (Hoch
and Loewenstein, 1991; Csikszentmihalyi, 1999; Diener et al., 1999; Sheldon
and Lyubomirsky, 2006). The book was discussed and appreciated in the 1996
symposium of Critical Review by Amartya Sen and Albert Hirschman, among
others, and it even had the honour of being classiﬁed as one of “The hundred
most inﬂuential books since World War II” by the Times Literary Supplement
on 6 October l996.2
However, Scitovsky’s analysis of the “well-being of the individual person”
(Scitovsky, 1986, p.ix) has not yet been fully investigated, and today it ap-
pears not be integrated into conventional economic theory. He has instead
been deﬁned as an “outlier” (Angner and Loewenstein, 2007), or a “questioning
economist” (Bianchi, 2003). When the Easterlin paradox has been discussed,
1The existence of the Easterlin paradox has subsequently been both conﬁrmed (Easterlin
and Angelescu, 2009; Layard et al., 2009), and challenged (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008), al-
though a consensus seems to emerge if well-being is measured in its most emotional component
(Kahneman and Deaton, 2010; Oswald, 2010).
2For an account of Scitovsky’s intellectual life and contributions see Earl (1992), and
Bianchi (2003). Scitovsky’s book especially inﬂuenced consumer research (e.g. Bianchi 2002;
Frank 1999; Earl and Potts 2004).
2Scitovsky has usually been mentioned and cited in regard to aspects of his book
which are not the most central and innovative ones.3
The present paper proposes a model with which to capture the most innova-
tive aspects of the analysis in Scitovsky’s book and his other related works, and
to show how it can be integrated into conventional economics. His contributions
to happiness economics, and to the income-happiness paradox in particular, will
thus emerge clearly.
Scitovsky’s main argument is that people’s dissatisfaction is due to their
excess of demand for ‘comfort’, compared to demand for ‘creative activities’.
Comfort essentially requires consumption goods, and tends to form habits, or
even harmful addictions. Creative activities are rather characterised by novelty,
and require, in addition to consumption goods, both leisure and the skill to enjoy
these activities. Such skill was called ‘leisure skill’ by Scitovsky, to underline
when this skill is usually exercised, but he rather meant the more general skill
to “organize our life” (1992[1976], p.269). He argued that people usually fail to
develop this skill, so to underappreciate the creative activities.
Since Scitovsky’s notion of comfort also included the social comfort of com-
paring one’s own consumption with that of others, this analysis enriches and
strengthens the most popular solution of the income-happiness paradox. Ac-
cording to this solution, comparing one’s own consumption with that of others
implies that individuals play a zero-sum game where nobody is better-oﬀ while
consumption of all rises, but richer individuals neverthelss remain more satisﬁed
than poorer ones. Scitovsky’s analysis thus contributes to understanding why
individuals are induced to compare their consumptions.
Encapsulating Scitovsky’s thought in a model also helps clarify to what
extent his analysis can be integrated into conventional economics. The main
example is Scitovsky’s argument that the primary motivation driving the cre-
ative activities is to enjoy them for their own sake, so that their eﬀect on the
formation of an individual’s leisure skill can be regarded as an ‘internality’. This
internality interacts with the individual’s attempt to select the most adequate
creative activity, so to yield interesting but unconventional results: that the in-
dividual may follow a path of well-being development which is not optimal, and
that there does not generally exist the case of optimal information such that the
individual ﬁnds it convenient to cease learning to improve her/his well-being.
Scitovsky thus anticipated the use of results obtained in psychology which
has become usual in ‘behavioural economics’ (see Camerer et al., 2004). He
also anticipated speciﬁc results recently conﬁrmed in psychology and other dis-
ciplines, such as the beneﬁt of curiosity, as implied by creative activities, and
the harm of boredom, as implied by the lack of creative activities. Therefore,
Scitovsky’s “hope to open a new ﬁeld of enquiry” (1992[1976], p.288) may come
to be fulﬁlled.
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 introduces the main new concepts
and arguments of Scitovsky’s analysis of well-being, and brieﬂy reports some
3Scitovsky has been cited as representing the interpretation based on comparison consump-
tion (Oswald 1997; Frank 1997), or on adaptation (Sheldon and Lyubomirsky 2006).
3supporting empirical evidence from the literature; section 3 formalises the core
of this analysis into a model of consumer choice and preference dynamics, and
then resolves the model; section 4 shows how the income-happiness paradox can
be interpreted along Scitovskyian lines, and what policies are thus implied; the
Conclusions end the paper.
2 Scitovsky’s main concepts and arguments
The main concepts and arguments in Scitovsky’s analysis on well-being refer to
‘comfort’, ‘novelty’, ‘creative activities’, and ‘leisure skill’. Since these concepts
and arguments are rather new, some brief explanations are necessary, so as to
provide the basis for the model set out in the following section. Scitovsky’s
book draws on the empirical results of psychological literature of the 1950s and
1960s in order to ground its psychological concepts and arguments. More recent
evidence will be thus mentioned at the end of this section so as to provide an
update to this grounding.
‘Comfort’ and ‘novelty’ are two sources of satisfaction with two types of
underlying motivations that Scitovsky regarded as “mutually exclusive alter-
natives” (S., 1992[1976], p.72, where S. henceforth denotes Scitovsky).4 The
individual would aim at achieving comfort as a goal in order to prevent or re-
lieve discomfort and pain. Income and consumption goods are the means to this
end, while no special skill is required to appreciate and enjoy comfort. In fact,
in this case individuals are completely informed about their skills, and on how
to satisfy their preferences. Scitosvky claimed that consumer theory usually
limits itself to considering only this case (S. 1992[1976], p.30).
Moreover, Scitosvky observed that the satisfaction obtained from comfort is
rapidly reduced by two psychological mechanisms. First, the individual becomes
habituated to comfort, “usually without full awareness” (S., 1992[1976], p.129),
so that s/he needs greater amounts of it to be satisﬁed. If habit takes the
strong form of addiction, the harmful eﬀects on well-being are even greater (S.
1992[1976], pp.124-131). Second, since comfort includes the social comfort of a
good standing on the income scale, achieving a new level of comfort would be
frustrated by others’ achievements (S., 1992[1976], p.119; 1986[1985], pp.199-
200).
Alternatively, the individual searches for ‘novelty’ by pursuing ‘creative ac-
tivities’ in order to enjoy the pleasure of both challenging her/his faculties and
learning new things. Creative activities are thus intrinsically motivated because
enjoyment is expected from performing the activity itself (S., 1986[1985])5. Ac-
cording to Scitovsky, this type of activity does not necessarily employ mar-
ketable products, as in the case of human relations (S. 1986[1972], p.61, see also
4Scitovsky also referred to the crowding-out of motivations, thus citing the motivational
psychologist Edward Deci (S., 1986[1985], p.202), who has subsequently strengthened this
claim with new evidence (Deci et al., 1999).
5The ﬁrst reported date refers to the published collection of articles, while the date reported
in square brackets refers to the original article.
41986[1973], pp.17, 19), and it is typically performed during leisure time (e.g., S.
1992, pp.vii-viii). He thus underlined the importance of time in this experience
of learning.
The typical creative activity is artistic work, both professional and nonpro-
fessional (S., 1992[1976], pp.304-7). More generally, an activity is creative when
“extending or deepening one’s experience and knowledge of the world” yields
enjoyment (S. 1986[1972], p.60).
However, the enjoyment expected from activities of this type is uncertain be-
cause the individual obviously does not know the content of the novelty. More-
over, but s/he does not even know whether s/he is prepared to enjoy it, or, in
Scitovsky’s terms, whether s/he is equipped with an adequate ‘leisure skill’. If
the degree of novelty of the activity chosen is scant, s/he experiences boredom;
by contrast, if the degree of novelty is excessive with respect to the individual’s
leisure skill, s/he experiences anxiety (S. 1992[1976], pp.46-52, 59).6
Scitovsky also used interchangeably the term ‘consumption skill’, originally
derived from the case of women’s skill in managing the budget to satisfy very
diﬀerent consumption needs of the household (S., 1992[1976], p.73). He thus in-
tended to show a case where information about the diﬀerent options is especially
far from complete. He also used the term ‘life skill’ (S. 1992, p.333), by which he
meant the skill to take important choices on the basis of the experience of a few
similar events (S. 1986[1979], pp.123-124). To show what makes an individual
thus skilful, Scitovsky suggested the example of the arts, where appreciation
comes from seeing “behind” the most apparent meaning (S. 1992[1976], p.56).
Therefore, ‘leisure skill’ is ultimately the skill that induces the individual to take
options which appear more uncertain but which s/he feels to be most reward-
ing. In support of this conclusion, Scitovsky referred to Keynes and Schumpeter
when they talked about “animal spirits” and “urge to action” (S. 1986[1985],
pp.189,198).
Scitovsky also held that the individual could acquire leisure skill at an early
age through a healthy relationship with the caregivers, when creative activi-
ties should be the normal activities (S. 1992[1976], pp.49, 227; 1996, p.603;
2000), and then through education, when humanistic culture, as love for intel-
lectual progress, should be of central place (S., 1992[1976], ch.11; 1986[1972],
p.60). Leisure skill can be seen as a component of human capital because it
cumulates; but it is a special component, because its future return is espe-
cially diﬃcult to evaluate because of the uncertainty of novelty (S., 1992[1976],
pp.123-4, 231). Leisure skill thus tends to cumulate as a side-eﬀect during the
individual’s successful experience of creative activities, which are in fact moti-
vated by immediate intrinsic reasons. When this experience is unsuccessful, e.g.
because of inadequate caregiving and education, leisure skill may fail to cumu-
late. It may even deteriorate, thus inducing the individual to seek an immediate
compensation - as substance addiction and other risky behaviour make evident
(S., 1992[1976], pp.xi, 294; 2000, pp.49-50). Therefore, these side-eﬀects of the
6Scitovsky represented this aspect with the Wundt curve, which is well-known in psychology
(S. 1992[1976], p.35).
5leisure skills can be said to be positive or negative ‘internalities’.7
Scitovsky’s psychological concepts and arguments have received support
from several recent studies in economics, psychology and other disciplines. The
search for novelty and the pursuit of creative activities have been investigated
in psychological research on curiosity, and on the need for cognition. In fact,
“curiosity is deﬁned as a positive emotional-motivational system associated with
the recognition, pursuit, and self-regulation of novel and challenging opportuni-
ties” (Kashdan et al., 2004, p.291), while the need for cognition is the tendency
to engage in eﬀortful cognitive activity as an intrinsic motivation that can be
developed through repeated or prolonged episodes of eﬀortful problem solving
(Cacioppo et al., 1996). It has been found that curious people or ones with a
strong need for cognition usually report greater well-being (Kashdan and Steger,
2007), are more socially related (Kashdan and Roberts, 2006; Cacioppo et al.,
1996), are healthier in old age (Silvia and Kashdan, 2009), and live longer (Swan
and Carmelli, 1996). In particular, individuals with a high need for cognition
tend to seek, acquire, and reﬂect in order to make sense of stimuli, relationships,
and events in their world by drawing on both cognitions and aﬀect, intuitions
and images; whereas individuals low in need for cognition tend to ignore, avoid,
or distort new information, and to pay close attention to social comparison cues
(Cacioppo et al., 1996; Petty et al., 2009).
Further conﬁrmation of Scitovsky’s intuition is provided by a psychological
study which observes that individuals feel and enjoy interest in a new activity
when there is an adequate match between their appraisal of the objective novelty
content and their appraisal of their coping potential to understand such novelty
(Silvia and Kashdan 2009).
Scitovsky’s unusual idea that uncertainty due to novelty may be pleasurable
(S. 1992[1976], p.57) has also received some conﬁrmation from recent research
in neurosciences (Berns et al. 2006; Knutson and Cooper 2006).
Boredom was one of the main concerns in Scitovsky’s later writings, but only
recently has it been found to be positively correlated with psychological and
physical health symptoms, like depression, compulsive behaviour, depression,
anxiety, and even aggression (Sommers and Vodanovich 2000; Vodanovich et al.
1991; Dahlen et al. 2004). Indeed, it seems that boredom presages delinquent
behaviour (Horvath and Zuckerman 1993) and substance abuse (Iso-Ahola and
Crowley, 1991). An epidemiological study has even found that individuals with
a great deal of boredom are more likely to die during follow-up than those not
bored at all (Britton and Shipley 2010).
Scitovsky’s bi-partition of motivations for comfort and for novelty is consis-
tent with a body of empirical evidence in psychology which shows that extrin-
sic motivations, which are goal-oriented, cluster around preferences for “ﬁnan-
cial success, appearance, and social recognition”, whereas intrinsic motivations,
which are experience-oriented, cluster around preferences for “self-acceptance,
7The original term used by Scitovsky for ‘internality’ is ‘internal economies and disec-
onomies’, which are generally deﬁned as “internal side-eﬀects that the production and/or the
enjoyment of goods and services can have on the transacting parties”, and that “many people
ignore” (S. 1995[1993], pp.203-4).
6aﬃliation and community feeling.” Similar extrinsic aspirations are associated
with greater well-being more than are intrinsic aspirations (Kasser, 2002:129).
A study in experimental psychology shows that extrinsic motivations are more
attached to goal- or level-orientation, whereas intrinsic motivations are more
attached to experience- or change-orientation (Hsee et al. 1991). Finally, an
economic and cross-country study ﬁnds that, on controlling for income, individ-
uals with higher levels of intrinsic motivation relative to extrinsic motivation
also enjoy greater satisfaction with life (Salinas-Jiemenez et al. 2010).
Research in developmental psychology helps explain how individuals develop
the speciﬁc skills required to appreciate exploration and novelty. For example,
the ‘attachment approach’ maintains that the infant seeks to establish commu-
nication with the caregivers on whom s/he is entirely dependent for survival. If
the caregivers are able to respond, ‘secure’ attachment arises, so that an infant
feels secure in both exploring and relating with new others. If the caregivers are
hyperprotective or control emotionality, ‘insecure’ attachment arises, so that the
infant is disappointed in her/his need for relatedness, and refrain from explo-
ration (Bowlby 1969; Ainsworth et al. 1978). This approach has been success-
fully tested on infants and children on many occasions and in various countries
(Berscheid and Reis 1998). ‘Attachment styles’ seem also to characterise ado-
lescents and young adults. Longitudinal studies reveal that early attachment
strongly conditions later experience, even during adulthood (Sroufe et al., 2005;
Waters et al., 2000).
Economic research has recently recognized that investing in children has
very high returns (Cascio 2009; Heckman et al., 2009). In particular, Heckman
et al. (2010) recognize that family environments and investments in children
(mainly represented by parental education and maternal ability) causally aﬀect
the development of their skills of both cognitive and socio-emotional type, as
evidenced by the outcomes of dropping out of school, incarceration, smoking,
and teenage pregnancy. Economists usually stress the importance of economic
conditions for adequate parenting, but their conclusions appear similar to those
of psychologists (e.g. Sweeting and West 1995). In Heckman’s (2008, p.16)
words: “a substantial body of evidence suggests that a major determinant of
child disadvantage is the quality of the nurturing environment rather than just
ﬁnancial resources available.”
3 The model
The model will represent an individual whose choice set groups together all
her/his activities into two options, i.e. ‘comforts’ and ‘creative activities’. In
the comfort option, the individual expects to achieve the maximum comfort from
the basket of activities involved, as assumed in conventional consumer theory.
However, s/he evaluates comfort not in absolute terms, but in comparison with
that of others. Moreover, s/he may experience some adaptation over time.
For the option of creative activities, the model will specify four main charac-
teristics: the essential requirement of leisure time, besides consumption goods,
7so to capture the experience aspect of this option; the consequent growth or
deterioration of individual’s leisure skill depending on how much the experience
has been successful; the individual’s attempts to adjust the degree of novelty
(by selecting another creative activity) in order to make the experience as suc-
cessful, i.e. adequate to his/her leisure skill; the possibility to enjoy creative
activities with more novelties, the greater is his/her leisure skill.
The two options are greatly substitutable, thus capturing the underlying
alternative motivations. The comfort option is especially preferred when the
leisure skill is at especially low levels.
Therefore, the changes in an individual’s well-being, as captured by the
utility index, will be studied as the result of the interdependent and endogenous
dynamics of the pleasure that s/he derives in pursuing creative activities, her/his
skill change, and her/his attempt to adjust novelty, vis-à-vis the comfort derived
from the alternative option.
Subsection 3.1 sets out the assumptions, and subsection 3.2 resolves the
model.
3.1 Assumptions
Let us assume that both options of the individual’s choice set require some quan-
tity of an undiﬀerentiated consumption good, called C. In this way, it is clear
that the diﬀerence between the two options does not lie in the characteristics of
consumption goods.
Let us start with creative activities. These require a share of the individual’s
ﬁxed (and unitary) available instantaneous time, called A, and the consumption
good, thus denoted with Ca. Let us simplify matters by assuming that this
option requires A and Ca in ﬁxed proportions, which may change for exogenous
reasons (as brieﬂy discussed in section 4). Formally, this option is thus:
min(γAt,Ca,t) with 0<γ<∞ (1)
where γ refers to the inputs proportion, and the subscript t makes the attached
variables time-varying.
This option appears as in (1) for its quantity dimension only, being measured
in time and quantity of goods. In order to capture its quality dimension, as
subjectively evaluated, let us consider the enjoyment (u) that the individual
derives from a unit of this option as a function of two variables: its degree of
novelty, measured by the real number χ, and the individual’s skill in appreciating
novelty, measured by the real number S. Formally:
ut = u(St,χt) with 0<St<∞, 0<χt<∞ (2)
This function should fulﬁl three requirements. It should capture the fact
that the individual experiences a reduced enjoyment if the degree of novelty is
too low (boredom), or if it is too high (anxiety), so that the optimal experience is
in between. In our terms, for every given level of S, there exists an optimal level
of χ, say χM, such that u has a global maximum labelled with uM. The second
8requirement is that the more skilled is the individual, the greater the optimum
level of the degree of novelty s/he can enjoy. Thirdly, function (2) should capture
Scitovsky’s idea that if the individual is especially low-skilled, and hence prone
to boredom or anxiety, s/he ﬁnds this option highly substitutable with the
comfort option. That is, u greatly drops when S is especially low.
To fulﬁl these requirements, function (2) may appear as in Figure 1, and it
is assumed to display, without any loss of generality, the following properties.
On the plane (S,χ) there exists the relationship:
χM
t = χM(St) with χM
S >0, χM
SS ￿ 0, χM(0)=0 (3)
where the subscripts S and SS indicate ﬁrst and second derivative respectively.
The function uM can thus be deﬁned by substituting (3) into (2):
uM (St) = u(St,χM(St)) (4)




t = 0, uM





SS > 0 for St<s, uM
SS=0 for St=s, uM
SS<0 for St>s (6)
where s ∈]0,∞[ is the threshold below which the individual ﬁnds this option
especially substitutable with the comfort option. The properties in (5) and
(6) thus depict a rising and S-shaped curve for uM. The deﬁnition of uM also
requires the following properties of function (2):
uχ > 0 and uS < 0 if χt<χM
t (7)
uχ < 0 and uS > 0 if χt>χM
t (8)
<=====Fig.1: A representation of the function ut = u(St,χt) ======>
Function (2) thus deﬁnes the range χ<χM as the region where the individual
will experience boredom, whereas in the range χt>χM
t , s/he will experience anx-
iety.8 Consistently with the Wundt curve as depicted by Scitovsky (1992[1976],
Fig.1), u may rapidly drop in the latter region for every given S, as χ rises,
meaning that anxiety becomes panic when χt>>χM
t .
The alternative to the novelty option is the comfort option, which does not
require leisure time but only the consumption good, thus denoted with Cb. This
good is evaluated in comparison with that of others, say c.
The individual’s utility function in the two options can thus be speciﬁed as:
Ut = U[ut min(γAt,Ca,t),(Cb,t/c),−ηZb] (9)
The main properties of this function are that the two arguments (ut min(·))
and (Cb/c) are concave, essential, and can be easily, but not perfectly, substi-
tuted. Therefore, equation (9) reads thus: satisfaction from activities displaying
8Csikszentmihalyi (1990), on studying the relationship between our S and χ to deﬁne the
optimal experience, boredom and anxiety, uses a diagram (as here in Figure 2), which is the
projection of function (2) on the (S,χ)-axes.
9novelty positively depends on the good match between the individual’s skill,
which is given to her/him at time t, and the novelty embodied in those activi-
ties, and on how much time and how many consumption goods s/he can devote
to these activities. Satisfaction from comfort depends only on the consumption
goods bought from the market. The arrival of novelty, if well-matched with
individual’s skill, thus works as a positive shock to the utility function. This
case is similar to Schumpeter’s case where the innovation works as a positive
shock to the production function (Schumpeter, 1939, p.87).
The term Zb in equation (9) is an index for past consumption of Cb (equation
(16)), so that, at every point of time t, it is given. This term will capture the
formation of habit or even addiction to comforts.
In order to buy the consumption good, the individual must work at the
wage rate w (measured in C units), which is exogenously given. The budget
constraint is thus:
Ca,t + Cb,t = wLt 0<w<∞ (10)
where L denotes the time share devoted to working.
The time constraint is set thus:
At + Lt = 1 (11)
The dynamic part of the model includes an equation for describing the indi-
vidual’s skill change, and the conditions that describe her/his attempt to adjust
the degree of novelty of the chosen activity, i.e. χ. The formation of habit will
be also speciﬁcally considered.
The equation for the skill dynamics is as follows:
˙ St = φut min(γAt,Ca,t) − δSt with 0<φ<∞, 0 ￿ δ<∞ (12)
where the dot denotes the derivative with respect to time, φ denotes the im-
pact of experience on skill accumulation, and δ represents the autonomous rate
of the decay of the skill, as suggested by Becker (1996) when considering the
accumulation of human capital.
The conditions for adjusting the degree of novelty should avoid the assump-
tion that the individual knows χM in advance, because s/he knows whether the
degree of novelty is at the optimum only when it is revealed and matched with
her/his skill. The individual only knows that s/he has experienced, although to
a diﬀerent extent, boredom, i.e. χ<χM, or anxiety, i.e. χ>χM, or, as a special
case, neither of them, i.e. χ=χM.
Her/his adjusting behaviour can thus be modelled in a very general way as
follows:




St if χ<χM (13)
˙ χ = 0 if χ=χM (14)




St if χ>χM (15)
10where m and n are, for simplicity, two positive and ﬁnite coeﬃcients. The
equations say that the individual searches for a higher or lower degree of novelty,
the more severe has been his experience of boredom or anxiety respectively.
Leisure skill appears in (13) and (15), although being unnecessary, in order to
capture Scitovsky’s emphasis on the fact that this skill helps in selecting the
creative activity with the adequate degree of novelty.
Scitovsky also introduced habit formation and addiction to comfort, as in
the case of drug addiction, by observing that in these cases the individual is
ﬁrstly attracted, but then s/he is trapped with little satisfaction, or even with
dissatisfaction, and increased quitting costs. Let us then assume that Zb, which
appears in the utility function (9), represents cumulated past consumption of
Cb according to the following standard equation:
˙ Zb,t = Cb,t − ϕZb,t with 0<ϕ<∞. (16)
The model is closed by assuming that the individual maximises U by choos-
ing allocation of time between A and L, subject to time and budget constraints,
having considered her/his endowment of skill (S), and by selecting the creative
activity so to adjust its degree of novelty with respect to the previous experience
(χ). Maximisation remains static, thus capturing Scitovsky’s ideas that future
return of creative activities is especially diﬃcult to evaluate, and that people
are conservative in predicting changes in their leisure skill.9
3.2 The solution
The individual maximises U as given by function (9), and having considered the
constraints, deﬁnitions, and properties (1)-(8), and (10)-(11). A solution for A
(denoted by a star) thus exists:
0 ￿ A∗




If u →0, then A∗ →0, C∗
b → w, and U∗ tends to the minimum for given
w,c,γ. If u → uM, and uM → ∞, then A∗ → 1/(1 + γ/w), C∗
b → 0, and
U∗ tends to the maximum. Therefore, ∂A∗
∂u >0, being u and A∗ monotonically
related.
If A∗ is suﬃciently close to its maximum, then ∂A∗
∂w >0 is warranted. For any
admissible level of A∗, then ∂A∗
∂w >0 if γ is suﬃciently great, since 1/γ weights
the Ca-component of the creative activities, which is aﬀected by w. However,
∂A∗
∂w <0 if γ is suﬃciently small.
The level of u depends on S and χ, which are given at a given time, so that
the dynamic of u depends on the dynamics of S and of χ. In order to study
9Scitovsky thus refer to people, who “were gradually lured into a new way of life by
their love of comfort, unaware at ﬁrst of the costs involved and ﬁnding themselves fully
accustomed to their new ways by time they realize the extent of the loss of pleasure suﬀered.”
(S. 1992[1976], p.73). More recently, behavioural economics has recognised that individuals
systematically fail in predicting their own future utility changes (Loewenstein et al., 2003).
11the dynamics of S, let us plug A∗ into the accumulation function (12), thus
obtaining:
˙ St = φu(St,χt)γA[u(St,χt),w,c,γ] − δSt (18)
Let us then study the isocline ˙ S=0 from (18) on the phase plane in the
(S,χ)-axes, and, at ﬁrst, the portion of the isocline that lies in the region χ<χM.
The implicit derivative theorem yields that
∂χ
∂S>0 because of (7), so that the
isocline is rising. If χ → χM, then the isocline tends to intersect χM. In fact,
the intersections of the isocline with χM can be found by substituting χ with






Both the l.h.s. and the r.h.s of (19) are rising in S by starting from the neigh-
bourhood of zero, but the properties of uM in (5)-(6) guarantee that, apart from
the trivial one, which is a limiting case, two intersections exist if δ is neither
suﬃciently low nor suﬃciently high. If δ is suﬃciently low, then one intersection
exists. If δ is suﬃciently high no intersection exists.
Let us then study the portion of the isocline ˙ S=0 in the region χ>χM. The
implicit derivative theorem again yields that
∂χ
∂S>0 because of (8), so that the
isocline is rising again. If χ → χM, then the isocline tends to have the same
intersections as in the previous case.
Note that the term φu(St,χt)γA[u(St,χt),w,c,γ] exhibits very convex iso-
quants of u on the (S,χ)-axes, so that the two arms of the isoquant start from
the same point lying on χM, and both rise, although in the two opposite regions
χ<χM and χ>χM respectively. Therefore, if δ is neither suﬃciently low nor
suﬃciently high, the two portions of the isocline ˙ S=0 scale up the isoquants by
starting from the left intersection with χM(S), and pointing to the right towards
the other intersection with χM(S) although lying in the two respective regions.
The isocline ˙ S=0 is thus almond-shaped, as in Figure 2. If δ were suﬃciently
low, then the ﬁrst intersection would coincide, with the origin, at the limit. If δ
were suﬃciently high, then no isocline ˙ S=0 would exist other than the limiting
case of the origin.
<=====Fig.2: Phase-plane in the (S,χ)-axes=====>
Note also that ˙ S →0 for S →0.
For any given χ(<χM), then ∂
∂S ˙ S<0 in (18), so that the isocline ˙ S=0 in this
region describes a locus of attraction. Hence, the trajectories on the phase plane
point rightwards if they lie on the left of this portion of the isocline ˙ S=0; the
trajectories point leftwards if they lie on the right of the same isocline. These
dynamics of S obviously cease when ˙ S=0.
For any given χ(>χM), then ∂
∂S ˙ S>0 in (18) if the u-function is suﬃciently
steep. Hence, the trajectories point towards the vertical axis if they lie on the
left of this other portion of the isocline ˙ S=0; the trajectories point rightwards
if they lie on the right of the same isocline.
Since function (18) is continuous, the trajectories at χM maintain the same
direction that they have in the horizontal neighbourhoods of χM.
12Since the vertical axis is an attractor line, it also attracts all the trajectories
not previously deﬁned in both regions.
The dynamic of χ is rather simple, since the properties in (13)-(15), and the
properties of the u-function (2) directly yield two conclusions: that the isocline
˙ χ=0 lies on the curve χ=χM (S) of the phase plane, and that this isocline is an
attractor line of χ.
The model thus yields three equilibria: the trivial one, like E1 in Figure 2,
which is a limiting case, and the two intersections between the isoclines ˙ S=0 and
˙ χ=0, like E2 and E3. The basin of attraction of the trivial stable point includes
the regions where S is very low for any χ, and where S is not very low, but
χ is either very low or very great. All trajectories departing from the starting
point outside these regions eventually approach the greatest intersection, i.e.
E3. Hence, only the E1- and E3-types of equilibria are dynamically stable. The
trajectories that tend to the trivial point represent the case where time tends to
be entirely allocated for consuming Cb, so that U∗ would be at the minimum.
At the other stable equilibrium point (E3), which is thus Pareto-superior, a
proportion of time is also devoted to A and to Ca. The smaller δ is, the further
the E3-type of equilibrium is from the trivial point, the greater the proportion
of time allocated to A, and the greater is U∗.
These conclusions are not qualitatively altered by also taking into account
the formation of habit and addiction according to equation (16). In steady-
state (16) becomes Zb=C∗
b/ϕ, so that satisfaction from repeatedly consuming
Cb diminishes, because the positive contribution of Cb has been eroded by the
negative contribution of Zb in equation (9) at the speed given by ϕ. The net
contribution of Cb may be even zero if η were suﬃciently great, thus representing
the case of complete adaptation. The case of addiction would even suggest a
negative net contribution of Cb. Utility U∗ is consequently aﬀected in a negative
way. If at some point of time C∗
b increased because of some shocks in the
parameters, e.g. w, the beneﬁt would be temporary, because Zb would grow
according to equation (16). Quitting from this consumption would make things
even worse, since the cost of quitting, in terms of U, rises insofar as Zb grows.
In the trajectory pointing to E1, U∗ would diminish at greater rates in the case
of habit or addiction. In the trajectory pointing to E3, U∗ would decelerate.
A ﬁnal interesting conclusion regards the lack of maximisation of U over time.
Not only the trajectories do not necessarily point to the E3-type of equilibrium,
which is the Pareto-superior one. But at any given moment of time, U∗ could
be higher if χ were equal to χM. Even if the trajectory approached χM, after
having reduced χ so that at χ=χM, the trajectory would not stop there, because
the individual’s skill would generally increase, and the existing degree of novelty
would become too low. One may eventually approach E3, but this case is not
warranted because individual’s life is ﬁnite. The equilibrium like E3 may be
even not exist because δ may be suﬃciently low. Therefore, the individual, even
in favorable conditions, generally appears in search to improve U∗.
134 Solving the income-happiness paradox
In his later writings, Scitovsky emphasised one of the most dramatic aspect of
the US, i.e. the diﬀusion of self-destructive and anti-social behaviours, such
as drug addiction and violence (1992[1976], p.294). He then argued that this
tendency “may be explained by the inadequate parenting of children” (S., 1996,
p.601), and more precisely, that “boredom [...] is the consequence of children’s
inadequate parenting and students’ insuﬃcient schooling in peaceful leisure ac-
tivities” (S., 2000, p.51).
In terms of the model suggested, these statements can be captured by the
case of individuals who, although being born with a normal endowment of skill,
say S2<St=0<S3 in Figure 2, experience a degree of novelty in their activities
during infancy, say χt=0, which was very low with respect to χM (St=0). In
fact, χt=0 is not chosen by the child but is usually ﬁxed by parenting and pre-
primary school educators. In this case, the point (St=0,χt=0) lies in the basin
of attraction of E1 in Fig.1, and it represents the case of severe boredom. This
appears to be relieved by consuming comfort as substitute goods. However,
the beneﬁt is temporary, because the low level of creative activities does not
allow individuals’ skill to accumulate, so that boredom arises again, and it
may even become anxiety. In Figure 2 the trajectory is pointing to the trivial
equilibrium, so that Cb especially cumulates with negative eﬀects on U∗ through
Zb in equation (9).
In his book, Scitovsky mainly referred to boredom in the aﬄuent society,
where the lack of creative activities is typically revealed by the time spent
watching television, with the ensuing regret for this behaviour (S., 1992[1976],
pp.232-235). This case may be captured by individuals who start with a mildly
lower level of χt=0 with respect to χM (St=0), so that they experience boredom,
but they also attempt to remedy it by looking for novelty. This case lies in the
basin of attraction of E3, but the dynamic is relatively slow, which is relevant
since individuals’ lives are ﬁnite.
The model predicts that behaviours of the type of drug addiction and heavy
TV viewing may become prevalent in the case of economic growth, as captured
by the exogenous rise of w. Indeed, the eﬀects of the rise in w is to increase
C∗
b relatively to C∗
a, and to increase L∗ and reduce A∗, if creative activities are
little intensive of consumption goods, i.e. if γ is suﬃciently low. Consequently,
individuals experience a reduced accumulation of leisure skill, so that they tend
to approach the E3-type of equilibrium more slowly, or approach the E1-type
of equilibrium more quickly, or turn from the former tendency to the latter.
In terms of Figure 2, the basin of attraction of the E3 diminishes since the
almond-like shape of the isocline ˙ S=0 shrinks. Therefore, with the rise of w,
every generation of individuals experiences less and less accumulation of S, or
even experiences decumulation. The eﬀects of w and S on U∗ are opposite in
sign, so that U∗ rises less than w, and it may even decrease.
This contribution to explaining the income-happiness paradox enriches and
strengthens the most popular explanation, which is based on comparing con-
sumption (or income) (Clark et al. 2008). Since in the case of economic growth
14also others’ consumption would rise, then both w and c rise in the model. But
the rise of c makes the alternative option, i.e. the creative activities, more ap-
pealing, thus counteracting the eﬀects due to the rise of w. Consequently, both
A∗ and the basin of attraction of E3 may diminish at lower rates. If E3 dis-
appeared and all trajectories eventually pointed to E1, then U∗ would tend to
remain constant, despite the rise of w.
Therefore, insofar as creative activities are pursued, the negative external-
ity due to comparison consumption does not erode the beneﬁcial eﬀect of eco-
nomic growth on well-being. In the limiting case where no creative activities
are pursued, economic growth does not give any beneﬁt to well-being, which
is completely eroded by the comparison consumption eﬀect. The standard in-
terpretation based on comparing consumption assumes no alternative option to
this choice, so that individuals’ frustration in seeing their well-being eroded by
comparisons cannot be escaped. The Scitovksyian interpretation helps under-
stand why the alternative option becomes increasingly precluded.
The model is also able to give account of the second most popular inter-
pretation of the income-happiness paradox, i.e. the one based on ‘adaptation’,
which is a negative internality due to habituation to past consumption (Clark
et al., 2008). Adaptation has been already considered by the dynamics trig-
gered by equation (16), and by the term Zb in equation (9). Complete oﬀsetting
adaptation would emerge in the limiting case where demand were completely
shifted towards C∗
b, η were suﬃciently great (and c were constant), so that U∗
may remain constant, despite the rise of w.
Growth in w could be endogenised if human capital for production purposes
were introduced into the model, i.e. if a third share in the allocation of time, be-
sides A and L, were used in order to accumulate human capital, thus increasing
w in future periods. This time investment in human capital would be more at
the expense of A∗ than of L∗, thus representing Scitovsky’s argument that the
future return on productive human capital is more certain than that on leisure
skill.
In conclusion, the model is able to contribute substantially to solving the
income-happiness paradox because it oﬀers a new explanation as to why happi-
ness may lag behind income over time, and because it strengthens the existing
explanations. The fact that the erosion of happiness by comparison and adap-
tation may be partial can thus be better understood. Moreover, also the expla-
nation of harmful addiction is new, because it is based on both habituation and
the rise of the opportunity costs due to failures in enjoying creative activities,
thus departing from the Beckerian explanation of the rising marginal utility of
addictive consumption.
Positive externalities of leisure skill towards social creative activities are
not considered by the model. However, if the individual taken for reference is
representative of the community, then a social multiplier would apply in the
case of these externalities.
The policy options implied by Scitovsky’s analysis are rather new, at least
in regard to priorities among economic policies. Scitovsky recommended, in
fact, that especial attention to be paid to adequate parenting (S., 2000), and to
15humanistic education (S., 1992[1976], pp.224-5, 229). In terms of the model, ad-
equate parenting means ﬁnding a level of χt=0 as close as possible to χM (St=0).
In this case, the trajectory would start within the basin of attraction of E3,
thus representing the beneﬁts of adequate parenting as brieﬂy discussed and
documented in section 2. The high costs of remediation of inadequate parenting
at later ages may be represented by the contrast with the trajectory, which had
already achieved the basin of attraction of E1.
Scitovsky’s second main recommendation regards humanistic education for
the formation of leisure skill at school, in contrast to the education restricted
to market-oriented specialisation (see also Nussbaum, 2010). More generally,
cultural policy should provide more opportunities and favourable contexts so as
to make intrinsically motivated activities more eﬀective in acquiring novelties.
In terms of the model, this type of intervention would increase φ, which would
enlarge the basin of attraction of the E3.
Scitovsky gave the arts a special place in humanistic education. Any policy
favouring the skill to appreciate the arts would alleviate the problem of ﬁnancing
them, also known as Baumol’s ‘cost disease’ problem.
Finally, as the title of Scitovsky’s (1986, ch.14) article How to Bring Joy
into Economics suggests, optimistic scenarios arise if once-for-all policies are
eﬀective in encouraging people to use consumption goods for creative purposes
(Ca), rather than for comparison (Cb), i.e. to increase γ. In this case the rise
in w may have a prevailing income eﬀect on demand for Ca, so that economic
growth may favour creative activities. Moreover, if the formation of skill in
appreciating novelty aﬀects the skill for innovation, as some results in psychology
suggest (Collins and Amabile 1998; Isen 2000), this would help economic growth
to become endogenous (Pugno, 2006).
5 Conclusions
When Scitovsky delivered lectures on his book, he found “unanimous hostility to
[his] ideas” (S., 1976, p.xv). Orthodox economists probably disliked the subjec-
tivist and psychological bases of his approach, while institutionalist economists
probably disliked his liberal thought (S., 1992[1976], p.19). Even in our times,
Scitovsky’s proposal has not yet been integrated into conventional economics,
and, in the case of happiness economics, only his analysis on comparative con-
sumption seems to be recognised. This paper has sought to re-read Scitovsky’s
proposal from a conventional perspective, and to re-establish his contribution,
by relying on the recent attention in economic research to psychology results.
Interesting conclusions can thus be drawn. First, an original contribution for
understanding the income-happiness paradox emerges. Secondly, both popular
interpretations of the paradox, i.e. the ones based on relative income and adap-
tation, thus become enriched and strengthened. Thirdly, new policy options
may arise.
Scitovsky opened a new line of inquiry, and this paper is a theoretical con-
tribution in this direction. His interpretation of the income-happiness paradox
16still awaits comprehensive empirical investigation, but encouraging results have
recently emerged. For example, the excessive demand for comfort at the expense
of social relationships, with negative eﬀects on well-being, seems conﬁrmed in
the case of over-eating, and hence obesity, where self-control problems appear to
play a role (Stutzer, 2007; Downs et al., 2009; Katsaiti, 2010). Similar results
emerge in the case of excessive television viewing (Frey et al. 2007; Benesch
et al. 2010; Bruni and Stanca 2008; Corneo 2005). Another example regards
the dynamics of the social component of creative activities, as proxied by gen-
eral trust in people. This indicator exhibits for the US during recent decades a
declining trend (Robinson and Jackson, 2001) which appears to account for, to-
gether with relative income, the stagnant level of average self-reported happiness
(Bartolini et al., 2011).
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